This is an advanced notice for those looking to seek remedy and/or enforcement from a refusal for cause. If you are not sure what a R4C is, please see this article for more.
The clerk is in authority over the record and therefore has more authority than the judge. The judge may order the clerk but he can only do so within the rules of court. Since the judge is a taxpayer he obviously has no sway and is recused from the case, leaving the court of record (authority) being with the clerk. Refusal for Cause will only work on novations (innovations) and initial presentments. However it works a lot more often that one might expect. What you see with all this privacy invasion is a flurry of R4C’s on the record in the dismissed Libels of Review. If you read any Libel of Review (LoR) you will find an example clerk instruction. If you get a presentment of any form that you do not like then Refuse it for Cause. Put a copy in your evidence repository and include a copy of the clerk instruction back to the presenter. You have done all you can to stop the process. If you are entrenched and the presenter knows it, maybe it will not work. The administrative billing processes are much more voluntary than many would like to believe.
Point 012 B. Affiant has no record or evidence that Affiant is restricted from proceeding in Admiralty Jurisdiction.
ADMIT – Libellee(s) listed within this document admit and agree to the procedures set forth under Admiralty Jurisdiction for settlement and closure to the issues at hand in this instant matter.
EXHIBIT 012 B – NOTICE of Libel of Review in ADMIRALTY
John-Quincy: Jones, lawful man, agent
Real Party in Interest
1. The district court of the United States is the proper venue and has jurisdiction to hear this libel of review. This is a proceeding in Admiralty.
“In this country, revenue causes had so long been the subject of admiralty cognizance, that congress considered them as CIVIL CAUSES OF ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME JURISDICTION, and to preclude any doubt that might arise, carefully added the clause, ‘including’, etc. This is clear proof that congress considered these words to be used in the sense they bore in this country and not in that which they had in England. The Act gives exclusive admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to the district court. As a court of the law of nations…
THE HUNTRESS, 12 Fed. Case 984 @ 992 & 989, (Case No. 6,914) (D. Me. 1840):
2. As further evidence that the action before the court is in fact an Admiralty action we find in UNITED STATES of AMERICA v $3,976.62 in currency, One 1960 Ford Station Wagon Serial No. OC66W145329,
“Although, presumably for purposes of obtaining jurisdiction, action for forfeiture under Internal Revenue Laws is commenced as Proceeding in Admiralty, after jurisdiction is obtained proceeding takes on character of civil action at law, and at least at such stage of proceedings Rules of Civil Procedures control.
3. The Petitioners refer the court to 1 Benedict, 6th ed, chap 17, pg. 28, which reads in pertinent part: “As no court other than a court of admiralty can enforce maritime liens, no other court can displace, discharge or subordinate them. Neither the state courts nor the United States courts on their common law, equity and bankruptcy sides can divest, transfer to proceeds or adjudicate the maritime liens unless the maritime lienor voluntarily submit themselves to the jurisdiction. [emphasis added]
4. Pursuant to 28 USC 2463 “All property taken or detained under any revenue law of the United States…shall be deemed in the custody of the law and subject only to the orders and decrees of the courts of the United States having jurisdiction thereof.” [emphasis added]
5. As a further indication that the issue before the court is a matter of admiralty, Petitioners refer the court again to “Benedict’s Admiralty,” 7th ed., Vol. 2, Chapter IV, par 51 ftn. 7. “…(i)t is now generally held that government tax claims under 26 USC 6321 ‘upon all property and rights of property whether real or personal’ rank below all other maritime liens…”
6. “A cardinal principle, in which the practice of admiralty courts differs from that of courts of common law, permits the parties to a suit to prosecute and defend upon their rights as such rights exist at the institution of the action; the assignment of a right of action being deemed to vest in the assignee all the privileges and remedies possessed by the assignor. According to the rule of the common law, the injured party alone is permitted to sue for a trespass, the damages being deemed not legally assignable; and if there be an equitable claimant, he may sue only in the name of the injured party. In admiralty, however, the common practice is to have the suit conducted in the names of the real parties IN INTEREST.” 1 R.C.L. 33, pg. 424 (1914); “…and when a statute of the United States so provides, an action for the use or benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the United States.” F.R.Civ.P. 17. The district courts are prohibited from granting venue where the United States has less than “one-half of its capital stock…” of the Respondents/Libelants Principal, the Fund and Bank. 28 USC 1349 The government by becoming a corporator (see 22 USCA 286e) lays down it s sovereignty and takes on that of a private citizen 28 USC 3002 (15) (A-C). It can exercise no power which is not derived from the corporate charter. (see: The Bank of the United States vs. Platners Bank of Georgia, 6 L.Ed. (9Wheat) 244; U.S. vs BURR, 309 U.S. 242). The REAL PARTY IN INTEREST is not the de jure “United States of America” or “State”, but “The Bank” and “The Fund”. (22 USCA 286, et seq.). The acts committed under fraud, force and seizures are many times done under “Letters of Marque and Reprisal”, i.e., “recapture”. (see 31 USCA 5323) Such principles as “Fraud and justice never dwell together”, Wingate’s Maxims 680, and “A right of action cannot rise out of fraud.” Broom’s Maxims 297, 729.
7. “According to international law it has long been established that, although a person who claims to be the owner of a ship is bound by the character fastened upon her by the flag, under which he has chosen to let her pass, captors are not affected by the flag, but are entitled to go behind it, and to show the true character of the ship by reference to the substantial interest in it, the effective control over it, and the real proprietorship of it.” Prize Law During the World War , James Wilford Garner, MacMillian Co., (1927) sec 284, pgs 378, 379, quote of Sir Samuel in the Kankakee, Hoching and Genesee, British Prize Court 1918. (see Benedict, 6th ed., sec 400, pgs. 92 & 93. 254 U.S. 671 @ P. 689, Admiralty Rules of Practice – Claim-How Verified-Rule 25.
8. This court lacks jurisdiction over the Petitioners who are appearing specially and not generally. Although in most courts special appearance has been abolished and in this instant case since the issue before the court is admiralty, the Petitioners point out: “While the modern version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (h) (1) has abolished the distinction between general and special appearances for virtually all suits brought under those rules, the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims has been preserved two forms of restricted appearance…Rule E(5)(a) …Rule (E)(8)…The rules were fashioned in order to avoid subjecting an in rem party, John-Quincy: Jones, to the jurisdiction of the court with reference to other claims for which ‘such process is not available or has not been served…’…” U.S. v. Republic Marine, Inc., 829 F2d. 1399 @ p. 1402.
9. Petitioner draws attention to 2 Benedict, 6th ed., sec 275, pg 119, 120: “But where a party discovers that … he has had no proper notice…and has thereby deprived of property; or where there has been fraud of any kind…so that no regular remedy is left him he may obtain redress by filing a libel of review. The subsequent proceedings will be the same as in any suit and the decree of the court will be such as equity demands. There is no corresponding provision in the Civil Rules.” (emphasis added)
10. The Petitioner/Claimant pray the indulgence of the court in reviewing 26 USC 7323 JUDICIAL ACTION TO ENFORCE FORFEITURE. 7323 (a) reads: Nature and Venue. The proceedings to enforce such forfeitures shall be in the nature of a proceeding in rem in the United States District Court for the district where such seizure is made. (see Petitioners Exhibit D). No action was brought against John-Quincy: Jones in the United States District Court.
11. The Petitioner/Claimant again direct the attention of the court to 26 USC 7401 AUTHORIZATION. No civil action for the collection or recovery of taxes, or of any fine, penalty, or forfeiture, shall be commenced unless the Secretary authorizes or sanctions the proceedings and the Attorney General or his delegate directs that the action be commenced. A review of the record maintained by the Attorney General failed to show any authorization.
12. As a matter of public record contained in the GAO audit of 1992/3 the Internal Revenue Service falsifies documents routinely in order to meet its goals. (See pg. 5 of audit results.)
13. Since the statutes themselves declare that seizures and forfeitures are admiralty operations, the property is held by the law and cannot be conveyed unless by court order. A question arises based upon the actions of the Respondents/Libelants. Monies have been seized from the John-Quincy: Jones fiduciaries as noted in the Verified Complaint. Evidently no court of competent jurisdiction has been notified, served or engaged in any fashion or manner. (Again see Petitioners/Claimants Exhibit D) This is a clear violation/failure of due process circumventing the 4th and 5th Articles in Amendment to the Constitution for the United States of America (taking without just compensation).
14. Through the testimony of witnesses and evidence at hand and to be discovered, evidence of a systematic scheme or enterprise is visible which are predicated acts under R.I.C.O. statutes 18 USC 1961 et. seq. To wit: three or more parties engaged in an unlawful activity to deprive American citizens of their property without just compensation or due process of law pursuant to 18 USC 2, 3, 4, and 241.
15. Under 26 USC 6902 (a) burden of proof. “…burden of proof shall be upon the secretary to show that the Petitioner is libel as a transferee [or back up withholding agent of tax payer] of property of tax payer, but not show that the tax payer [United States] was libel for the tax. Petitioner/Claimant et. al., is not claiming any rights to tax court implied or otherwise.
16. In the above statement of the court will note that the term United States was inserted after tax payer. The association between the International Monetary Fund and it’s contractual member the United States (for definition see 28 USC 3002 (15) (A,B,C)) present a fortiori which demands an examination of the contractual arrangement/agreement that in any way hold the Petitioner/ Claimant responsible as co-signors to such instrument. This simply precludes the cavalier use of the term tax payer and demands a narrow interpretation of same. The term tax payer for the purposes of this document are not those associated with the common English language. Very simply put, the term tax payer does not apply to John-Quincy: Jones in this instant action but refers to the United States in it’s corporate capacity in all instances.
17. No indication of any bond or surety has been made by the international Monetary Fund or it’s agents. As a matter of fact, no action has been filed before any court of competent jurisdiction. (see Exhibit D) The Attorney General (AG) for the United States as indicated in the documents before this court is unaware of any action civil, criminal or otherwise pending pursuant to 26 USC 7401. (see Exhibit E) A possibility exists that property may be concealed, converted or destroyed to preclude the intervention of this Honorable Court. In such instances the prohibition contained in 26 USC 7421 do not apply. It was not the intention of Congress to circumvent the safe guards contained in the 4th and 5th Amendments of the Constitution for the United States of America and therefore, enacted 5 USC 706 for the purposes of review of administrative agencies. Pursuant to the United States Attorney’s Manual (USAM) 6-5.330 INJUNCTION ACTIONS: Section 7421(a), provides, generally that no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment of any tax shall be maintained by any person in any court, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed. In light of 26 USC 7421, injunctive relief may be had only upon satisfaction of the twofold test laid down in Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962).
18. It is interesting to note that the term BY ANY PERSON IN ANY COURT is used in the above cite. The law is dis-positive in directing that, “ALL PROPERTY taken or detained UNDER ANY REVENUE LAW of the United States…shall be deemed in the custody of the law and subject only to the orders and decrees of the court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof.” (emphasis added) Since no court order issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction is evident a question is raised, who receives the property and where did the money go that was in the custody of the law? (see USC 2463. Did the governor of the International Monetary Fund or any of his agents post a bond (28 USC 2464) in order to protect the interest of the United States of America? Is it reasonable to assume that this court is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act 26 USC 7421 in protecting the property that is placed in it’s custody by the agents of the International Monetary Fund pursuant to the revenue laws of the corporate United States?
19. Upon review of the Unification Act of 1964 and interesting comment was made which bares light on this instant case. This following is not a direct quotation but is simply paraphrased: Most attorneys and for that matter most courts are singularly lacking expertise in Admiralty/Maritime Law. Judicial Canon #1 is extremely important. Due diligence and a complete review of the merits of the case are necessary in the interest of justice. These pro se litigants are not knowledgeable in the law and rely upon the discretion of the court to apply justice fairly and evenly pursuant to 28 USC 471, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure – Rule 81 and rights and safe guards paid for in the highest premium, the blood of patriots, for the people of the United States of America and their posterity.
By: __________________________ _______
John-Quincy: Jones, agent, Real Party in Interest date
I, John-Quincy: Jones, upon my own unlimited commercial liability, do say that I have read the above Memorandum and do know the contents to be true, correct, and complete, and not misleading, the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
John-Quincy: Jones, lawful man date
I, ______________________________ , a notary public residing in ________________ county, ________________ state, do say that on the date of ______________ , 2004, a man known to me as John-Quincy: Jones did appear before me in his true character and did affix his signature to the above document.