The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that:
“No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it.”. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401 (1958).
Any judge who does not comply with his oath to the Constitution of the United States wars against that Constitution and engages in acts in violation of the Supreme Law of the Land. The judge is engaged in acts of treason. Having taken at least two, if not three, oaths of office to support the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of the State of Illinois, any judge who has acted in violation of the Constitution is engaged in an act or acts of treason (see below). If a judge does not fully comply with the Constitution, then his orders are void, In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888), he/she is without jurisdiction, and he/she has engaged in an act or acts of treason.
TREASON
Whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason. U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821)
What is the penalty for treason? Any judge or attorney who does not report the above judges for treason as required by law may themselves be guilty of misprision of treason, 18 U.S.C. Section 2382.
Whenever any officer of the court commits fraud during a proceeding in the court, he/she is engaged in “fraud upon the court”.
In Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985), the court stated “Fraud upon the court is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself It is where the court or a member is corrupted or influenced or influence is attempted or where the judge has not performed his judicial function — thus where the impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupted.”
Fraud upon the court” makes void the orders and judgments of that court. It is also clear and well-settled Illinois law that any attempt to commit “fraud upon the court” vitiates the entire proceeding. The People of the State of Illinois v. Fred E. Sterling, 357 Ill. 354; 192 N.E. 229 (1934) (“The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters applies to judgments as well as to contracts and other transactions.”); Allen F. Moore v. Stanley F. Sievers, 336 Ill. 316; 168 N.E. 259 (1929) (“The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters …”); In re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill.App.2d 393 (1962) (“It is axiomatic that fraud vitiates everything.”); Dunham v. Dunham, 57 Ill.App. 475 (1894), affirmed 162 Ill. 589 (1896); Skelly Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 338 Ill.App. 79, 86 N.E.2d 875, 883-4 (1949); Thomas Stasel v. The Federal law, when any officer of the court has committed “fraud upon the court”, the orders and judgment of that court are void, of no legal force or effect.
In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “Disqualification is required if an objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge’s impartiality. If a judge’s attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge must be disqualified.” [Emphasis added].
Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1162 (1994). That Court also stated that Section 455(a) “requires a judge to recuse himself in any proceeding in which her impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Taylor v. O’Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989).
In Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972), the Court stated that “It is important that the litigant not only actually receive justice, but that he believes that he has received justice.”
“Recusal under Section 455 is self-executing; a party need not file affidavits in support of recusal and the judge is obligated to recuse herself sua sponte under the stated circumstances.” Taylor v. O’Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989).
None of the orders issued by any judge who has been disqualified by law would appear to be valid. It would appear that they are void as a matter of law, and are of no legal force or effect.
Should a judge not disqualify himself, then the judge is violation of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The right to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice is based, not on section 144, but on the Due Process Clause.”).
Should a judge issue any order after he has been disqualified by law, and if the party has been denied of any of his / her property, then the judge may have been engaged in the Federal Crime of “interference with interstate commerce”.
The judge has acted in the judge’s personal capacity and not in the judge’s judicial capacity. It has been said that this judge, acting in this manner, has no more lawful authority than someone’s next-door neighbor (provided that he is not a judge).
However some judges may not follow the law. If you were a non-represented litigant, and should the court not follow the law as to non-represented litigants, then the judge has expressed an “appearance of partiality” and, under the law, it would seem that he/she has disqualified him/herself. However, since not all judges keep up to date in the law, and since not all judges follow the law, it is possible that a judge may not know the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court and the other courts on this subject. Notice that it states “disqualification is required” and that a judge “must be disqualified” under certain circumstances.
JUDGE YOU HAVE BEEN AUTOMATICALLY DISQUALIFIED BY LAW.
The Supreme Court has also held that if a judge wars against the Constitution, or if he acts without jurisdiction, he has engaged in treason to the Constitution. If a judge acts after he has been automatically disqualified by law, then he is acting without jurisdiction, and that suggest that he is then engaging in criminal acts of treason, and may be engaged in extortion and the interference with interstate commerce.
Courts have repeatedly ruled that judges have no immunity for their criminal acts. Since both treason and the interference with interstate commerce are criminal acts, no judge has immunity to engage in such acts.
San
Awesome stuff you have here !! Yall are sain
ts!!
Mike Pincher
Do you know of any California state court that has equated fraud upon the court by a jurist or other court officer as treason? What about 9th Circuit? As a practicing attorney in California, I have not seen this on either the state or federal level.
patrick poux
i need your insight on my case
patrick poux
My judge denied me a reduction at his own discrestion even though i qualified for ot. and ther was a lot of shadiness i got whats PSR after i was sentence not before i was not aware of it as far what it was until i hire a second attorney who asked me for it. My first attorney knew prosecutor and hugh five him after my verdict. rail raoded
D J Saour
The defendant was unable to attend court due to a
well documented medical illness. The defendant therefore was unable to present her case that would have alerted the judge that the merchant (plaintiff) likely violated a state law that would have been considered a fraudulent practice by a merchant; the questions are:
1. Would an attempt by the merchant to pursue refund of a previously disputed and agreed upon refund made with the customer’s credit card issuer be unlawful to pursue in public court after the merchant credited/refunded the customer’s account. The merchant’s transactions appear intentional in order to avoid final judgement by the credit card issuer.
2. Would it automatically be assumed that any attempt by a merchant to pursue refund by an alternate method after the merchant agreed to (and in fact, did) credit (refund) the customer’s account for the full amount that the customer requested , is equivalent to failing to adhere to the terms and conditions of such an agreement. It certainly seems deceptive for a merchant to make a customer think she had won her private pursuit of refund only to be sued in public small claims court one month later for the exact same amount that the merchant had refunded the customer.
3. Given negotiations and therefore written statements between the investigators for the Visa cards are impossible to obtain from the investigator, would just the letter from the credit card issuer stating, “the merchant has now agreed to credit your account for $1,204.” be enough to prove there was a written agreement with a consumer to resolve a dispute that arises in connection with a consumer transaction?
4. While this letter also states “This credit will appear on your billing statement within the next two billing periods.”, the credit appeared in the same month as the date on the letter and the credit was given a posting date on the customer’s billing statement eleven days prior to the date of the letter. Then, the merchant waited less than 5 more weeks before filing a small claims court warrant in debt against the customer. Is the letter from the Credit Card issuer enough to prove the merchant did not abide by the following law? Would it just be presumed by everyone involved that if a merchant grants a refund/credit, he can’t later just ask for the refund back by suing the customer?
The actual law states.
A. The following fraudulent acts or practices committed by a supplier in connection with a consumer transaction are hereby declared unlawful:
17. If a supplier enters into a written agreement with a consumer to resolve a dispute that arises in connection with a consumer transaction, failing to adhere to the terms and conditions of such an agreement.
I’d certainly like to know if my credit card issuer can offer a condition: let’s just give the customer credit so we don’t have to pursue this any longer, then you can sue her to get your money back.