DUTIES OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Justice Bandeis eloquently affirmed his condemnation of abuses practiced by Government officials, who were defendants, acting as Government officials. In the case of Olmstead vs. U.S. 277 US 438, 48
S.Ct. 564, 575; 72 L ED 944 (1928) he declared:

“Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that Government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the Citizen. In a Government of laws, existence of the Government will be
imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.

For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a law-breaker, it breads contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself. It invites anarchy. To declare that, in the administration of the law, the end justifies the means would bring a terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine, this Court should resolutely set its face.”

The information created and surrounding the stricti juris doctrine regarding a particular license which may, or may not, be represented by and revealed within the contents and control of a license agreement “but must be revealed upon demand, and failure to do so is concealment , a withholding of material facts (the enducing, contractual consideration) known by those who have a duty and are bound to reveal.” Dolcater v. Manufacturers S Traders Trust Co., D.C.N.Y., 2F.Supp. 637, 641.

Penalty Under The Law

Under USC Title 42 §1986 . Action for neglect to prevent . . ., it states: Every person who, having knowledge that any wrongs conspired or to be done. . . and having power to prevent or aid in preventing . . . Neglects or refuses so to do … shall be liable to the party injured… and; The means of “knowledge”, especially where it consists of public record is deemed in law to be “knowledge of the facts”. As the means of “knowledge” if it appears that the individual had notice or information of circumstances which would put him on inquiry, which, if followed, would lead to “knowledge”, or that the facts were presumptively within his knowledge, he will have deemed to have had actual knowledge of the facts and may be subsequently liable for any damage or injury. (Public Officials have been given “knowledge of the facts” as it pertains to this conspiracy to commit a fraud against the people.)

It would be unconstitutional for an officer to coerce one to waive a fundamental right: “waivers of fundamental Rights must be knowing, intentional, and voluntary acts, done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. U.S. v. Brady , 397 U.S. 742 at 748 (1970); U.S.v. O’Dell , 160 F.2d 304 (6 th Cir. 1947)”. And that the agency committed fraud, deceit, coercion, willful intent to injure another, malicious acts, RICO activity and conspired by; Unconscionable “contract” – “One which no sensible man not under delusion, or duress, or in distress would make, and such as no honest and fair man would accept “; Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Noll 115 Ind. App. 289, 58 N.E.2d 947, 949, 950. and;”Party cannot be bound by contract that he has not made or authorized.” Alexander v.Bosworth (1915), 26 C.A. 589, 599, 147 P.607. And therefore; “Failure to reveal the material facts of a license or any agreement is immediate grounds for estoppel.” Lo Bue v. Porazzo , 48 Cal.App.2d 82, 1 19, p.2d 346, 348.

The fraudulently “presumed” quasi-contract us that binds the Declarant with the CITY/STATE agency, is void for fraud ab initio, since the de facto CITY/STATE cannot produce the material fact (consideration inducement) or the jurisdictional clause (who is subject to said statute) . (SEE: Master / Servant [Employee] Relationship — C.J.S .) — ” Personal, Private, Llberty “-

Since the “consideration” is the “life blood” of any agreement or quasi-agreement, (contractus) “… the absence of such from the record is a major manifestation of want of jurisdiction , since without evidence of consideration there can be no presumption of even a quasi-contract us . Such is the importance of a “consideration.” Reading R.R. Co. v. Johnson , 7 W & S (Pa.) 317 So without a Contract (no recording of the M.C.O.) or consideration there is no DMV / government etc. jurisdiction as the property does not “reside” in the colorable fictitious territory as evidenced in Supreme Court cite below:

In Wheeling Steel Corp v. Fox , 298 U.S. 193 (1936) it states: Property taxes can be on tangibles or intangibles. In order to have a situs for taxation (a basis for imposing the tax), tangible property (physical property) must reside within the territorial jurisdiction of the taxing authority, and intangibles . . .

Under USC Title 42 §1982 . Property rights of citizens further evidences the above position that the City or State cannot take land because they DO NOT have Jurisdiction. It states that federal or state governments / agencies MUST have a monetary or proprietary interest in your real private property in order to have jurisdiction over it (if your land has no government grant /funding or is not a subsidized government project, then agencies have neither). DEMAND any public servant/said agencies to provide the legal document that allows any federal or state agency to supercede and/or bypass Title 42 USC §1982 and/or §1441. Title 42 §1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights further protects Declarant’s private property. The State cannot diminish rights of the people. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516. ‘ ‘

“To say that one may not defend his own property is usurpation of power by legislature.” O’Connell v. Judnich (192 5), 71 C.A.386, 235 P. 664.

“A state MAY NOT impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted (sic) by the Federal Constitution.” MURDOCH v PENNSYLVANIA , 319 US 105. “… THE POWER TO TAX INVOLVES THE POWER TO DESTROY”. McCULLOUGH v MARYLAND, 4 Wheat 316.

“All subjects over which the sovereign power of the state extends are objects of taxation, but those over which it does not extend are exempt from taxation. This proposition may almost be pronounced as self-evident. The sovereignty of the state extends to everything which exists by its authority or its permission.” McCullough v Maryland , 17 U.S. [4 Wheat] 316 (1819). ‘

U.S. adopted Common laws of England with the Constitution.
Caldwell vs. Hill , 178 SE383 (1934).

To be that statutes which would deprive a citizen of the rights of person or property without a regular trial, according to the course and usage of common law , would not be the law of the land. ( Jury) Hoke v. Henderson , 1 5, N.C. 1 5 25 AM Dec 677.

“The phrase ‘ common law ‘ found in this clause, is used in contradistinction to equity, and admiralty , and maritime jurisprudence.” Parsons v. Bedford , et al, 3 Pet 433, 478-9.

WHEN LICENSING AND REGISTRATION IS REQUIRED

Automobiles Classified as Motor Vehicles

The Washington State Supreme Court has already made it clear in the following case that the “drivers license” is intended to apply only to “for hire” vehicles. (Emphasis added.)
“Sec. 103 It shall be unlawful for any person to drive an automobile or other motor vehicle carrying passengers for hire, within the city of Seattle, without having a valid and subsisting license so to do, to be known as a ‘drivers license’ …”Driver’s license, ‘first class’ shall entitle the holder thereof to drive any kind or class of motor vehicles for hire within the city of Seattle. “Drivers license, second class’ shall be limited to stages, sight-seeing cars, or other motor vehicles operating over a specified route and having a fixed terminal. “Drivers license, ‘third class’ shall be limited to drivers of taxicabs, for hire cars, or other automobiles not operating on fixed routes, and having a passenger capacity of less than seven (7) persons, not including the driver. …It is intended to apply to “for hire” vehicles as provided in section 6313, Rem. Comp. Stats., are defined to mean all motor vehicles other than auto- mobile stages used for the transportation of persons for which remuneration of any kind is received, either directly or indirectly.” INTERNATIONAL MOTOR TRANSIT CO. et al. V. CITY OF SEATTLE et al. , (No. 19992) 251 PACIFIC REPORTER 120-123 (Dec. 6, 1926.)
“For while a Citizen has the Right to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, that Right does not extend to the use of the highways, either in whole or in part, as a place for private gain. For the latter purpose, no person has a vested right to use the highways of the state, but is a privilege or a license which the legislature may grant or withhold at its discretion.” State vs. Johnson, 243 P. 1073; Cummins vs. Homes, 155 P. 171; Packard vs. Banton, 44 S.Ct. 256; Hadfield vs. Lundin, 98 Wash 516

Here the court held that a Citizen has the Right to travel upon the public highways, but that he did not have the right to conduct business upon the highways. On this point of law all authorities are unanimous.

“Heretofore the court has held, and we think correctly, that while a Citizen has the Right to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, that Right does not extend to the use of the highways, either in whole or in part, as a place of business for private gain.” Willis vs. Buck, 263 P. l 982; Barney vs. Board of Railroad Commissioners, 17 P.2d 82

“The right of the citizen to travel upon the highway and to transport his property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, differs radically and obviously from that of one who makes the highway his place of business for private gain in the running of a stagecoach or omnibus.” State vs. City of Spokane, 186 P. 864

What is this Right of the Citizen which differs so “radically and obviously” from one who uses the highway as a place of business? Who better to enlighten us than Justice Tolman of the Supreme Court of Washington State? In State vs. City of Spokane, supra, the Court also noted a very “radical and obvious” difference, but went on to explain just what the difference is:

“The former is the usual and ordinary right of the Citizen, a common right to all, while the latter is special, unusual, and extraordinary.” “This distinction, elementary and fundamental in character, is recognized by all the authorities.”
State vs. City of Spokane, supra.

This position does not hang precariously upon only a few cases, but has been proclaimed by an impressive array of cases ranging from the state courts to the federal courts.
“the right of the Citizen to travel upon the highway and to transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business, differs radically and obviously from that of one who makes the highway his place of business and uses it for private gain in the running of a stagecoach or omnibus. The former is the usual and ordinary right of the Citizen, a right common to all, while the latter is special, unusual, and extraordinary.”
Ex Parte Dickey, (Dickey vs. Davis), 85 SE 781